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Abstract: In this chapter I argue that emerging soldier enhancement technologies have the potential to transform the 
ethical character of the relationship between combatants, in conflicts between ‘Superpower’ militaries, with the ability 
to deploy such technologies, and technologically disadvantaged ‘Underdog’ militaries. The reasons for this relate to 
Paul Kahn’s claims about the paradox of riskless warfare. When an Underdog poses no threat to a Superpower, the 
standard just war theoretic justifications for the Superpower’s combatants using lethal violence against their 
opponents breaks down. Therefore, Kahn argues, combatants in that position must approach their opponents in an 
ethical guise relevantly similar to ‘policing’. I argue that the kind of disparities in risk and threat between opposing 
combatants that Kahn’s analysis posits, don’t obtain in the context of face-to-face combat, in the way they would 
need to in order to support his ethical conclusions about policing. But then I argue that soldier enhancement 
technologies have the potential to change this, in a way that reactivates the force of those conclusions.    
1. Introduction 
Any technological innovation that confers a welcome benefit upon the positionally-advantaged military 
force, carries a corresponding cost for the positionally-disadvantaged military force – at least temporarily, 
while the relevant technologies are distributed in a decidedly uneven fashion. And it is one of the ethicist’s 
jobs to worry about these costs, which are borne by the ‘have-nots’ in global conflict. For those who 
espouse an ethics of Absolute Pacifism, there won’t be much to say about the costs associated with 
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emerging military technologies (since – for Absolute Pacifists – no war can be rendered morally justifiable 
thanks to a novel military technology’s involvement in it). For all others interested in the ethics of warfare, 
however, the ethical significance of the costs accompanying new military technologies have to be 
examined case-by-case. 
What should we say, then, about the potential costs and possible downsides of soldier 
enhancement technology? For the technologically-disadvantaged military force (henceforth, the Underdog), 
one of the costs that accompanies the development of effective soldier enhancement technologies by an 
opposing, technologically-advanced military force (henceforth, the Superpower) is entirely generic: the 
Superpower’s large advantages over the Underdog – in weaponry, communications, transport, etc. – are 
bolstered by a further type of advantage, courtesy of which the Superpower becomes better able to 
cement its stranglehold over the coercive use of violent force in the global political arena. And the upshot 
of this is an entrenchment of the circumstances of asymmetric political violence, i.e. the kind of dynamics 
which drive Underdogs towards the use of terrorist violence against civilian populations. The significance 
of technological asymmetry as a precursor to such violence has been elucidated by others, and I won’t 
recapitulate that discussion here (see Killmister 2008; Fabre 2012, pp. 239–82). Instead I’ll attempt to map 
out a distinctive ethical problem which is generated by soldier enhancement technologies, albeit one that 
relates to a more general family of ethical issues in asymmetric warfare. As I will explain in §1, when major 
technological disparities separate the opposing sides in a political conflict, there is a plausible case to be 
made that these gaps render the use of lethal violence by Superpowers against Underdogs unjustifiable. If 
one accepts that view, though, it still remains unclear what uses of violent force are justifiable for 
Superpowers in such conflicts. And as I will argue in §2, the suggestion of people like Paul Kahn – that in 
these sorts of conflicts, Superpowers ought to eschew warfare in favour of policing – is unconvincing. Why? 
Here is my objection in brief. In approaching such conflicts as occasions for policing wrongdoing, rather 
than engaging in full-scale combat, the Superpower’s individual personnel relinquish the relatively un-
threatened position that they would otherwise occupy in a combat scenario with the Underdog. And thus, 
it seems to me, the shift to a policing approach cannot be obligatory for the Superpower, since the very 
basis of the rationale which is meant to make the Superpower’s shift to a policing approach obligatory, is 
the fact that the Underdog’s forces don’t pose any threat to the Superpower’s forces. Or so I’ll argue. The 
link with the topic of this collection will become clear in §3. My claim will be that the advent of effective 
soldier enhancement technology transforms the circumstances of threat and risk that obtain in conflicts 
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between Superpowers and Underdogs, in a way that may enable the Superpower to undertake a policing 
approach in a political conflict with Underdog, but without their personnel relinquishing the relatively un-
threatened position they would otherwise enjoy in full-scale combat with Underdog forces. And if that’s 
right, then the advent of effective solider enhancement technology supports the view that I outline in §1, 
by removing the objection that I present in §2. In a sense, then, what I will be arguing is that the 
development of effective soldier enhancement technologies can generate ethically significant costs on 
both sides of the military technology divides. The cost for the Underdog is to be faced with even greater 
technological disadvantages, which make the possibility of effective uses of violent force in political 
conflict even more remote. The cost for the Superpower – assuming they purport to abide by reasonable 
ethical constraints on armed conflict – resides in the fact that the advantages gained via soldier 
enhancement technology also generate onerous responsibilities in violent political conflict. What sort of 
responsibilities? In short, those that come with taking on the duties of policing.  
2. Technological asymmetry and the paradox of riskless war 
Several authors have recently defended something like the following claim: where there are large 
disparities in the combat capabilities of parties involved in an armed conflict, these disparities greatly 
shrink the range of circumstances under which it is morally justifiable for the advantaged party to carry 
out lethal attacks against the disadvantaged party (e.g. see Dunlap 1999; Kahn 2002; Galliott 2012a, 2012b; 
Steinhoff 2013; and Simpson and Sparrow 2014). The idea, put simply, is that the permissibility of killing 
in war depends upon there being a ‘fair fight’, in the sense that the belligerent opponents are not grossly 
unevenly-matched in their warfighting capabilities. If this view is correct, it casts a further shadow of 
doubt across the moral justifiability of a military superpower like the United States carrying out lethal 
attacks on enemy combatants in many of the conflicts that it has been involved in over the last 15 years, 
such as in Yemen, Afghanistan, the trans-Saharan region, and in the horn of Africa.1 Even if we assume 
                                                 
1 Of course the point that I’m making here doesn’t apply to the United States alone. I mention these asymmetric conflicts 
involving the US simply because the US is, by all measures, the most powerful and technologically advanced military force in the 
world today.  
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that the standardly-acknowledged ethical constraints on conduct in war are painstakingly honoured in 
such conflicts – even if it were true in these conflicts that US forces were limiting the damage that they 
were inflicting to what was necessary for the achievement of legitimate military aims, and only targeting 
enemy combatants, and taking significant further measures to minimise harm to non-combatants – it 
might still be the case that US forces were not justified in carrying out lethal attacks against opposing 
combatants in these conflicts.2 Why is that? In short, because the disparities between the combat 
capabilities of the US and their opponents here are far too great; the circumstances of mutual 
endangerment between the opposing fighters – which is a necessary condition for the justifiability of 
killing in war – simply do not obtain. Or so the argument goes. 
 In view of these considerations, Paul Kahn (2002) has argued that states with well-equipped 
military forces – ergo, Superpowers in particular – face a ‘paradox of riskless warfare’. Such states will 
naturally aim to achieve superiorities in combat capability which reduce, as far as possible, the risks 
incurred by their personnel in combat situations. But to the extent that such aims are realised – where a 
Superpower like the US succeeds in greatly mitigating the risk to their personnel in combat situations – 
the Superpower ipso facto delegitimises its employment of lethal force against the technologically 
disadvantaged Underdog, in view of the ‘fair fight’ constraint noted above. Kahn’s view has obvious 
ethical implications for the Superpower using unoccupied weaponised vehicles to conduct lethal attacks 
on opposing Underdog forces. The drone operator can kill enemy combatants from afar, while incurring 
no reciprocal risk. And this is, of course, the key consideration that makes drone warfare a strategically 
appealing combat option.3 For a proponent of Kahn’s view, however, the lack of reciprocal risk in the use 
of weaponised drones is precisely the thing which renders lethal drone attacks ethically unjustifiable. 
                                                 
2 Here I am gesturing toward the two core principles of jus in bello that figure in all standard accounts of just war theory – namely, 
(i) Proportionality (roughly: damage inflicted must be limited to what is necessary for the achievement of legitimate military ends), 
and (ii) Discrimination (roughly: belligerents must distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and target only the 
former) – along with the supplementary principle endorsed (e.g.) by Michael Walzer (2006, pp. 151 – 59), that combatants must 
take measures aimed at minimising accidental harm to non-combatants, even if doing so carries significant costs with regards to 
their own safety. 
3 I should note that some authors, like Bradley Strawser (2010), have argued that there is – over and above the manifest strategic 
advantages that come with the use of weaponised drones – in fact a moral duty for states to employ drones, in order to reduce 
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Jai Galliott has recently defended a similar conclusion, via a somewhat different route. His focus 
is on how the technological disparities between a drone-equipped Superpower and its Underdog 
opponents can preclude any adequate ethical justification for the decision to resort to armed combat in 
the first place. On all standard accounts of jus ad bellum, war – even war waged in the pursuit of an 
uncontroversially just cause – must be treated as a last resort. A state cannot justifiably resort to war unless 
it has previously exhausted the other strategic avenues that may be pursued in order to achieve whatever 
legitimate aims might (putatively) justify the resort to war. Galliott’s point is that in cases where 
Superpowers face Underdogs, it will seldom (if ever) be the case that we can credibly characterise full-scale 
combat as a last resort for the Superpower. Because of the Superpower’s enormous technological 
advantages, it will typically be at least possible for it to redress the aggression to which it is responding, 
without resorting to full-scale combat. So even if we assume that other constraints on justice in the resort 
to war are honoured, Galliot says, resorting to drone warfare is (often) impermissible, since it results from 
the more powerful state’s failing to treat war as a last resort (Galliott 2012a, pp. 62–64). 
  If the conclusion is correct – if large disparities in military technology ethically preclude lethal 
combat – then what uses of violent force are justifiable for a Superpower, A, in responding the aggression 
of an Underdog, B? According to Kahn, in such cases A should eschew warfare in favour of policing. 
Suppose state B has carried out acts of military aggression towards A, or that it has committed 
humanitarian atrocities that are so egregious as to justify A’s armed intervention. Under a warfare 
paradigm, A’s aim will be to forcefully overwhelm B’s capacity to use violent force in turn – e.g. by 
destroying B’s military hardware and/or personnel – to the point where B’s aggression can be decisively 
repelled, or its humanitarian atrocities prevented. By contrast, if A approaches the situation via a policing 
paradigm, its aims will be at least somewhat narrower, e.g. to apprehend culpable wrongdoers among B’s 
political or military leadership, and to instigate some process aimed at holding them formally accountable 
for their wrongdoing. 
                                                                                                                                                        
risks to their own personnel. Note also that some other authors, like Beauchamp and Savulescu (2013), have defended a similar 
conclusion, ostensibly on the grounds that states will be more ready and willing to carry out ethically meritorious wars of armed 
humanitarian intervention in cases where the use of drones can mitigate or eliminate risks to the personnel of the intervening 
state. 
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The invocation of a policing paradigm already assumes that the advantaged party has a decisive 
upper-hand in its capacity to exert violent force, such that there is no need for it to win an advantage over 
the wrongdoers. The aim of policing – where would-be wrongdoers are already decisively out-matched in 
their capacity to exert violent force – is to subdue, apprehend, and try the renegade actors who choose to 
engage in violent wrongdoing nevertheless. Note two further important differences between the 
paradigms. First: in war violent force may be directed against all enemy combatants. In policing, by 
contrast, violent force must be directed toward only those who have (or who are reasonably suspected to 
have) violated a prohibition whose violation itself supplies a justifying basis for the use of violent force. 
Second: in war, uses of lethal force are permitted outside circumstances of imminent self-defence, e.g. 
pilots can bomb an opponent’s military outpost, killing enemy combatants who do not pose an imminent 
threat to anyone’s life. In policing, by contrast, the use of lethal force is restricted to circumstances of 
defending against an imminent threat – the police officer may only fire upon a suspected wrongdoer if she 
believes (reasonably) that he is presently endangering another’s life. Granted, there are all sorts of ways in 
which a description of these differences could be qualified or more painstakingly formulated. The point is 
that where, in warfare, there is a general license to use lethal force against some specified class of persons 
– namely, enemy combatants – in policing there is no such general license. The prerogatives involved in 
policing relate to the use of sub-lethal violence for the purposes of law-enforcement. As in normal social 
intercourse, the justifiable use of lethal violence in policing is limited to circumstances of defence against 
an imminent threat to someone’s life.4 
                                                 
4 In saying that there is a general license to use lethal force against enemy combatants, in war, I do not mean to suggest that in war 
there is a completely unqualified license to kill enemy combatants. At a minimum, the jus in bello principle of proportionality imposes 
firm limits upon this license. As Tony Coady says, the “entitlement to injure and kill [enemy combatants] is restricted by its 
necessity for furthering the war aims that are legitimated by your just cause, and when attacks upon them are no longer required 
by those aims, then the normal respect for human life should resume and be exhibited in your conduct” (Coady 2008, p. 157). My 
point is merely that there is a difference between war and policing, in that only in the former is the general respect for human life 
(provisionally) suspended, with regards to a specified class of persons (i.e. enemy combatants). Though there are certain things 
that the police officer is in general permitted to do, which the rest of us are not in general permitted to do, ‘killing enemies’ isn’t 
one of them. The permissibility (or excusability) conditions of killing people are the same for the police officer as for the rest of 
us, differing in practice only by virtue of the fact that the police officer more often faces lethal threats than do the rest of us.   
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I should acknowledge that views like Kahn’s and Galliot’s, about the ethical ramifications of 
technological asymmetry in war, are founded upon the contested assumption, that opposing fighters are in 
general morally justified in using lethal force against one another in war. One may wonder, then, what the 
upshot would be if we followed those like Jeff McMahan (2009), who say that even in war, the justifiable 
use of lethal violence is – as in normal social intercourse – limited to circumstances of self-defence against 
an imminent threat. My view is that a version of Kahn’s paradox of riskless warfare arises even under 
McMahan’s more restrictive ethical framework for thinking about killing in war. The kind of case in which 
McMahan accepts the justifiability of killing in war is the case where the soldier doing the killing is 
engaged in self-defence against an imminent lethal threat, posed by an aggressor fighting in the name of an 
unjust cause. In this sort of case, as much as in any other, asymmetries in military technology can reduce 
the degree to which the Underdog’s soldier poses a lethal threat to the Superpower’s soldier. And so – 
even for the soldier fighting in self-defence against unjust aggression – there is a point where this disparity 
is so large, and (correspondingly) where the opponent’s threat is so negligible, that the use of lethal force 
against the aggressor ceases to be justifiable. In McMahan’s framework the initial range of cases of 
permissible killing in war is narrower than in a conventional just war theoretic framework. But, plausibly, 
there remains a common structure – across the two frameworks – to the way killings in war can be 
rendered impermissible due to technological asymmetries. 
3. The perils of policing 
Although I have considerable sympathy for Kahn’s account, at the same time something about it seems to 
me implausible. Where soldier S1 is fighting for a technologically-advanced military Superpower, A, and 
soldier S2 is fighting for a much less well-equipped military force, B, it is not clear why it should follow 
that the relational paradigm structuring the engagement between S1 and S2 is police-versus-criminal. Even if it 
becomes unfitting to regard the engagement between S1 and S2 as one of combatant-versus-combatant, this 
does not yet entail that a policing paradigm adequately describes the ethical contours of the interaction 
between S1 and S2. 
Suppose, on one hand, that the Superpower, A, is the aggressor in the conflict, e.g. suppose A is 
using military force in pursuit of an unjust aim, like territorial occupation, whereas the Underdog, B, is 
using military force in an attempt to counter A’s aggression. The problem, in that case, is that Kahn’s 
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approach still assigns S1 the role of ‘police’ and S2 the role of ‘criminal’. To say that A would be justified 
only in policing B’s conduct, rather than engaging in full-scale combat against B, is to overlook the most 
important ethical fact in the neighborhood, namely, the fact that A isn’t justified in exerting violent force 
against B in any form. If large technological asymmetries alter what forms of violence are justifiable for the 
Superpower, in anything like the way Kahn suggests, it may yet turn out that this effect only obtains where 
the Superpower has some kind of (defeasible) justification for exerting violent force in the first place.  
But even in that case, something in Kahn’s view seems awry. Suppose that Underdog B is the 
aggressor against Superpower A, such that A is justified, in principle, in using violent force to repel the 
aggression. And suppose that B’s armed forces are amassed in a military encampment near A’s borders 
(or, say, embassy), but not yet in the process of launching an attack against A. In such a case, can A’s 
forces take the initiative and launch a lethal attack on B’s encampment? The answer is surely ‘no’ – not if 
A is restricting itself to policing B’s wrongdoing, as opposed to engaging in full-scale combat with B. 
Analogously, if members of a police squadron know that the building across the street is occupied solely 
by people who are planning to carry out a killing spree, they – the police – still cannot respond to this by 
bombing the building to smithereens and thus killing all inside. They can try to apprehend the killers in 
advance. Or else, once the violent acts are initiated, they can use lethal force to stop them. But preemptive 
lethal strikes have no place in any ethically defensible form of police work. But then, if policing really is 
the appropriate framework for understanding the moral character of A’s interaction with B, A’s options 
for using force to resolve the situation – in a morally justifiable manner – are restricted to either (i) waiting 
for B’s aggression to commence before responding with force, or (ii) attempting to apprehend members 
of B’s forces, and thereby initiating a combat situation themselves. And in either case, it seems probable 
that more preventable killing will eventuate, than would have occurred if A simply approached its 
engagement with B under a combat paradigm, rather than a policing paradigm. Why? Because even if state 
A’s military force enjoys an enormous superiority in combat capability over state B’s force, A is very 
unlikely to be able to effectively police violent wrongdoing by B, if B’s members remain ready and willing 
to ‘go to war’ with A, before acquiescing to their own arrest. And as the perennial occurrence of 
asymmetric conflict demonstrates, the Bs of the world often are prepared to go to war with the A’s of the 
world, even while faced with seemingly insuperable disadvantages. The idea that large inequalities between 
armed forces transform combat into policing, trades upon a kind of ‘rational actor’ theory of armed 
conflict – the key supposition being that actors who can see that they are destined to lose in the event of 
9 
 
full-scale combat will allow themselves to be apprehended, before engaging in futile violence for the sake 
of an unwinnable conflict. But this supposition is unsafe. Where both sides understand their interaction as 
one of full-scale combat, and act accordingly, it seems more likely that a decisive outcome will be achieved 
quickly, with most of the costs being incurred by the disadvantaged state. By contrast, where the 
advantaged side sees itself as policing violent wrongdoing, while the disadvantaged side thinks of itself as 
fighting a war, the conflict is more likely to be drawn out, and significant human costs are more likely to 
be incurred on both sides. And in cases where the disadvantaged party is an unjust aggressor, the first 
scenario is obviously to be preferred over the second. If that’s right, then – in these sorts of scenarios – it 
may well be a grave mistake for the Superpower to approach its conflict with the Underdogs via a policing 
paradigm. 
Kahn and others are right to insist on the ethical indefensibility of the Superpower annihilating 
Underdog forces en masse. But where complete disengagement is not a viable option either – where the 
circumstances of the conflict necessitate an active response – the question we have to ask is: how should the 
technologically advantaged state conduct itself? And my point is that we cannot tell the military 
superpowers of the world to eschew warfare in favour of policing, not if by policing we mean anything 
like what we normally mean by the term in domestic political contexts. “If combatants are no longer a 
threat”, Kahn says, then “they are no more appropriate targets than non-combatants” (2002, p. 5). I am 
not objecting to this claim – rather, I am arguing that it is insufficient to establish Kahn’s claims about the 
Superpower’s duty to adopt a policing approach in all contexts. In the kind of asymmetric conflicts we are 
considering, wherever it is the case that the Underdog’s personnel pose no threat to the Superpower’s 
personnel, this is the case only while (and only because) the Superpower is actually exploiting its superior 
combat capability in order to suppress its opponent by violent force. If the Superpower eschews full-scale 
combat, in favour of a policing approach, it becomes possible once again for the Underdog’s personnel to 
carry out lethal attacks. As long as the individual soldiers who are responsible for carrying out on-the-
ground policing activity remain vulnerable to such attacks, the demand that they abstain from combat is 
equivalent to a demand that they relinquish their positional advantage, and the relative degree of safety 
which is concomitant with that advantage, in order to risk death at the hands of their opponents. And – 
especially if the conflict stems from the Underdog’s unjust aggression – this demand seems almost 
perverse. Whatever follows from Kahn’s paradox of riskless warfare, then, it cannot be any general 
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obligation, on the part of Superpowers, to approach political conflicts with Underdogs under a policing 
paradigm, instead of a warfare paradigm. 
4. The technologically-enhanced soldier as invulnerable police officer 
That is how things currently stand, at any rate. But soldier enhancement technologies have the potential to 
significantly alter the structure of conflicts between Superpowers and Underdogs – indeed, to transform 
the circumstances of threat and risk that obtain in these conflicts, in a way that will make it possible for 
the Superpower to adopt a policing approach in its conflict with the Underdog, but without its personnel 
relinquishing the relatively unthreatened position they would enjoy in full-scale combat with Underdog 
forces. Obviously not all types of soldier enhancement are pertinent in this connection. But one of the core 
aims of soldier enhancement – for instance, one of the central research agendas pursued by MIT’s 
Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies (see http://isnweb.mit.edu/) – is to adapt revolutionary materials 
technologies, in order to equip the Superpower’s military personnel with body armor and life-support 
systems, which will render them highly resistant to a wide spectrum of normally-lethal physical threats, 
including projectile ammunition, shockwaves, incendiary agents, neurotoxic agents, and vesicant agents. 
It’s possible, naturally, that the promises made on behalf of this technological research agenda are 
exaggerated. On the other hand, technological developments can sometimes outpace expectations, even 
the ambitious expectations of those undertaking the research. Suffice it to say, there is at least a non-trivial 
possibility that, in coming decades, US soldiers who are deployed in hostile territory will be equipped with 
armor and life-support systems which – from the more modestly-equipped, Underdog military force’s 
perspective – will make the US soldier extremely hard to seriously injure, and even harder to kill. To the 
extent that this transpires, the situation of the US soldier on-the-ground will become much more like the 
situation of the present-day soldier employing remote weaponry in a combat situation: it is not completely 
impossible for him to be injured or killed by enemy combatants, but the threat that he poses to the 
enemy’s life drastically outstrips the threat that the enemy poses to his life. What’s significant about this 
prospect, to put it another way, is that it recreates – at a micro level (i.e. in the up-close interaction between 
opposing fighters ‘on the ground’) – the asymmetric dynamic of risk and threat that obtains between the 
Superpower and Underdog at the macro level. At present, the Underdog forces as a whole pose only a 
negligible threat to the Superpower’s forces as a whole; and that dynamic is preserved for some members of 
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the Superpower’s military force (e.g. Underdog forces pose, at most, only a negligible threat to the 
Superpower’s fighter pilots and drone operators). Given the development of effective soldier 
enhancement technology, the prospect is that even troops on the ground, in near proximity to hostile 
enemy combatants, will be in the same (relatively) unthreatened position. 
 Under these conditions, Kahn’s controversial claim – that military Superpowers like the US must, 
in conflicts with Underdogs, eschew warfare in favour of policing – becomes rather more plausible. Under 
these conditions it becomes possible for the Superpower’s ground forces to carry out the basic functions 
of policing – e.g. apprehending wrongdoers, maintaining law and order – without thereby incurring the 
kind of vulnerability to lethal attacks by enemy combatants, which would come along with a shift from a 
combat footing to policing operations, under current conditions. If effective soldier enhancement 
technologies like those mooted above are achieved, then the Superpower’s technologically-enhanced 
troops will be in a position to police the conduct of the Underdog, in a way that the Superpower’s troops 
today aren’t, notwithstanding the existing (macro-level) disparities between Superpowers’ and Underdogs’ 
warfighting capabilities. And this would remove the objection that I offered in §2 to the argument 
outlined in §1. 
 I’ll finish by stressing what I very briefly noted in §2. This entire discussion is immaterial if the 
Superpower’s conduct, in its conflict with the Underdog, is unjust ad bellum. And though I won’t argue as 
much here, it’s doubtful that most (or even many) conflicts between Superpowers and Underdogs are ones 
in which the Superpower can assert the justice of its conduct ad bellum. If that’s right, then what is the 
upshot of this discussion? The upshot is that even more is required of the Superpower in order to acquit 
itself justly in its international relations, than we might have initially supposed. It is not sufficient for the 
Superpower to have just grounds for entering into the conflict with the Underdog ad bellum. Nor is it 
sufficient for the Superpower to adhere to the requirements of jus in bello within the conflict. The 
superpower must, in addition, take on the onerous responsibilities that come with eschewing full-scale 
combat and, instead, carrying out the duties and assuming the burdens of law enforcement. Soldier 
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enhancement technologies matter, in this arena, because they have the potential to remove a key objection 
to Kahn’s claim that it is morally obligatory for the Superpower to reconfigure its approach in this way.5 
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